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I NTRDDUCTI ON 
S cience and technology are the essential building blocks of con-temporary American society and governance. "Smart" bombs 
and other sophisticated weapons replace countless soldiers. Hybrid 
seeds, biotechnology, and fertilizers are the basis of agricultural pro-
ductivity. Job creation, global competitiveness, and the American 
standard of Jiving stand as the consequence of scientific insight and 
technological application. Acquisition of knowledge and provision 
of information and communication, whether through electronic 
impulses or on land, rest on science and technology. 
The effects of science and technology are immediate and abun-
dant. In a very real sense, what we do in the present dictates the 
shape of the future. Put another way, American society and govern-
ment's dependence on science and technology means that the future 
is now. 
The federal government has fully recognized science and tech-
nology's absolute centrality to contemporary existence. The greatest 
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share of the federal budget goes to pay for services and products that 
are science- or technology-based. But governmental appreciation of 
science and technology as its most important and most expensive ele-
ments is not new. Shortly before 1950, many American political 
leaders and others began to acknowledge that America's World War 
II success stemmed directly from its scientific and technological 
prowess. They also acknowledged that continued success in both mil-
itary and commercial spheres required nurturing. These sentiments 
manifested themselves most explicitly in the 1950 creation of the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), the first federal agency devoted 
entirely to the sponsorship and funding of scientific research. 
Establishment of the NSF marked the beginning of the federal 
government's marriage to science and technology that has now 
spanned more than a half century. The romance has remained 
impressively unflagging, even as the intensity of the infatuation has 
deepened. Favoring and fostering science and technology has been 
federal policy for more than fifty years. Yet it would be wrong to sug-
gest that continual, persistent support of and reliance upon science 
and technology means that the federal government's approach to 
nurturing and employing them has remained unchanged. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. Great differences have occurred and 
disputes have erupted over how to best achieve those ends. Ameri-
cans have repeatedly disagreed over techniques, programs, methods, 
and interests as they endeavored to find the most successful means 
to advance that national policy. This was true even as policy was 
being enacted. Many times the nation rearranged, shifted, and 
reconceptualized its federal science and technology policy while its 
ambitions-furthering and using science and technology-
remained constant. What needed doing was to analyze and explore 
the means, mechanisms, and methods by which various constituen-
cies pressed, reshaped, and refashioned the federal bureaucracy in 
pursuit of the nation's ambitions. 
Two works have begun to address the federal government's inter-
action with science. Both Bruce Smith's American Science Policy Since 
World War II (Brookings Institution, 1990) and Alexander Morin's 
Science Policy and Politics (Prentice-Hall, 1993) are program-specific, 
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deal with the inner workings of a bureaucratic group or Congress, 
and are heavily dependent on viewing science as a subsidiary of 
national defense. Their message is clear. America needs an effective, 
clearly stated, apolitical, and unchanging science policy if it is to 
maximize efficiency. 
Wonks and others find these books useful, but we have tried to 
do something more. We do not personify science, treat it as a non-
partisan actor among a cast of partisans. Nor do we ignore tech-
nology. Technology has an important place in the formulation. We 
attempt to employ science inclusively in our analysis. We discuss 
basic research, the applications of science and even social science-
the manipulation of people and process as well as the under-
standing thereof-which rarely figures in science policy analyses. 
Our broad, comprehensive outlook cannot and does not try to be 
a day-to-day, department-by-department rendering of science and 
technology policy. It uses instead scenes, case studies, or vignettes as 
indicative and illustrative of larger, important policies and programs. 
The studies are illustrative of the approaches, activities, and problems 
found in a wide variety of government initiatives. We also highlight 
what we see as critical and underappreciated areas, such as universi-
ties, which have been increasingly dependent on federal dollars and 
have increasingly become the engines through which national sci-
ence and technology policy is revealed. We also look at the roles of 
gender and minorities and how they are embedded in federal pro-
grams, the application of social science to the processes of funding 
and selecting research agendas, and technological initiatives as a jus-
tifiable means to discover and apply behavioral techniques. 
The volume is organized chronologically, which gives way in the 
1960s to an organization based on presidencies. The presidency 
assumed center stage in the 1960s and later as presidents set the 
nation's agenda as part of their executive duties. Their administrative 
styles, their philosophical and political principles and ambitions, 
and their distinctive personalities all translate into what kind of sub-
jects presidents favor, how they choose to interact with Congress, and 
what kind of relationships they wish to have with scientists and other 
acknowledged stakeholder groups. Rather than merely tracing the 
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development of a particular policy-defense, for instance-over a 
series of administrations, this book focuses on how a presidential 
administration is central not only to overall science and technology 
policy but also to individual science- and technology-based initia-
tives. An analysis of the former type ignores the fact that science and 
technology policies and activities are located firmly in time, creatures 
of specific social, political, cultural, and scientific moments. It is 
those moments that help explain why actions are taken and rejected. 
At the heart of any contemporary analysis of US science and 
technology policy is what is thought to be a rather simple question: 
What is or has been America's science and technology policy? Such 
a simple question is exactly the wrong question to ask, however. 
That contemporary Americans and others persist in asking it causes 
difficulties. By presuming that there has been-or should be-a dis-
crete, definable, tangible policy, analysts put themselves into a box. 
When people expect analysts to be able to answer such a question, 
it hampers or prevents serious attempts to analyze the situation 
beyond it. If that mode of thinking were actually put into practice, 
the resulting policies would be unhealthy for America. This volume 
neatly demonstrates that the idea of a discrete, unified, consistent 
approach to science and technology over time needs to be revised. 
It is possible to establish and mandate an unbending set of 
requirements and specifications for national policy, but to do so 
would court disaster. Situations are continually fluid, with huge 
unforeseeable economic and political dislocations and unknown 
relationships between economic policies, theories, and their goals. 
The past half century alone has proven that the problems and issues 
identified as confronting America change at such a prodigious rate 
that any attempt to set a precise course would certainly have to 
undergo revision after revision. Indeed, even if government claims 
to chart a "consistent" course today, that course will change virtually 
every six weeks. 
US monetary policy is a good example. The Federal Reserve 
Board meets monthly to decide how monetary policy needs to be 
rearranged, and it generally changes the interest rates to stimulate 
the type of activity it seeks. But even that practice is less than precise. 
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Within the last couple of years, Federal Reserve Board members have 
noted that certain economic activity expected from interest-rate tin-
kering just has not happened; the idealized mathematical model 
upon which they have operated does not reflect the real world. Put 
baldly, when we say we have a consistent monetary policy, not only 
are we wrong, but that expression also obscures how American gov-
ernment truly functions. 
By talking about a static policy, proponents of models build 
their wares for a world that does not exist. It is a world without 
change or, at best, with scheduled or predicted changes. Such model 
builders would lack the constancy of questions that need to be 
addressed or resolved and therefore the certainty of their approach 
to those questions would be compromised. Surely, an idealized 
world would make matters easy. You could anticipate and predict, 
then dictate a certain, specific course for the future. But by searching 
for that perfectly artificial world, you privilege that approach and 
thereby lose the absolute essence of what Americans actually do and 
of how incredibly well it works. 
Democracy is the strength of American governance. And that is 
how policy is actually made. It is made through battles among con-
stituencies in which the executive branch has by far the greatest say. 
Someone once said that policy is a lot like sausage; you may enjoy 
the taste but you won't want to see it being made. It is necessarily 
messy, inexact, dirty, and flawed. So too is modern existence. Policy 
in the real world does not conform to some sort of neat social sci-
ence formulation. That is not to suggest that planning, prediction, 
and thought are not-or have not been-critical aspects of past sci-
ence and technology policy making. They have been integral and 
valuable aspects in the past, but their true utility is as recommenda-
tion, not proscription. 
In American representative democracy, there is no shortage of 
persons and professions to outline their systematic and ad hoc 
plans/analyses and demand acceptance/implementation. It is the 
genius of American politics that one and several people sift through 
all the advice and select a course to pursue, and that persons who are 
subsequently thrust into the role of choosing a course are rarely 
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bound to their predecessors' course. Each electoral contest sends us 
in another direction; topics and subjects given short shrift in the past 
may suddenly capture center stage. In a democracy, there is often 
lurching back and forth, perhaps-intolerable inefficiencies to 
model builders-but excesses get smoothed out and consensus gets 
enhanced. In this way, new ideas and actions can enter the policy 
arena and be heard and considered without a commitment of per-
manence. Similarly, bad ideas can be removed and rejected in a rel-
atively small space of time. No one group, including those people 
who claim it is their special expertise to set policy, can capture the 
policy apparatus; they are a voice, not the voice. 
